1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9	FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
10	ROBIN BRENT MULL, Civil No. 08-720-AA OPINION AND ORDER
11	Plaintiff,
12	vs.
13	MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,
14	Defendant.
15	
16	Rory Linerud Linerud Law Firm
17	PO Box 1105 Salem, Oregon 97308 Attorney for plaintiff
18	
19	Karin Immergut United States Attorney
20	District of Oregon Britannia Hobbs
21	Assistant United States Attorney 1000 S.W. Third Avenue
22	Portland, Oregon 97204-2902
23	David Burdett Special Assistant U.S. Attorney
24	Social Security Administration 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 M/S 901
25	Seattle, Washington 98104-7075 Attorneys for defendant
26	AIKEN, Judge:
27	Claimant, Robin Mull, brings this action pursuant to the
28	Social Security Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and

1 - OPINION AND ORDER

1383(c)(3), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner denying his application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Act. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed and this case is dismissed.

## PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits on August 27, 2004. Tr. 11. This application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After a hearing, on January 16, 2008, the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff not disabled. Tr. 8-15. The Appeals Council declined to grant plaintiff's timely request for review. Tr. 3-5. This action resulted in the ALJ's January 16, 2008, decision becoming the final order of the Agency.

## STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Born February 19, 1960, plaintiff alleges disability beginning December 1998. Tr. 49, 78. Plaintiff alleges disability based on a combination of impairments, including the following: anxiety, panic attacks, neck pain, back pain, left knee pain, degenerative disc disease, arthritis, dyslexia, obesity as indicated by a Body Mass index of 35.4 (height of 5'9" and weight 240 pounds), herniated neck disc, and dislocated left knee. Tr. 38, 75, 81.

#### STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court must affirm the Secretary's decision if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. <u>Hammock v. Bowen</u>, 879 F.2d

498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

The court must weigh "both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Secretary's conclusions." Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986).

The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish disability. Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986). To meet this burden, plaintiff must demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected . . . to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. . . . " 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

The Secretary has established a five-step sequential process for determining whether a person is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 416.920. First the Secretary determines whether a claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity." If so, the claimant is not disabled. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).

In step two the Secretary determines whether the claimant has a "medically severe impairment or combination of impairments." <a href="Yuckert">Yuckert</a>, 482 U.S. at 140-41; <a href="See">see</a> 20 C.F.R. <a href="SS">SS</a> 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If not, the claimant is not disabled.

In step three the Secretary determines whether the impairment meets or equals "one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity." <u>Id.; see</u> 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If so, the claimant is conclusively presumed disabled; if not, the Secretary proceeds to step four.

In step four the Secretary determines whether the claimant can still perform "past relevant work." 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant can work, she is not disabled. If she cannot perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Secretary. In step five, the Secretary must establish that the claimant can perform other work. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141-42; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) & (f), 416.920(e) & (f). If the Secretary meets this burden and proves that the claimant is able to perform other work which exists in the national economy, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566, 416.966.

### **DISCUSSION**

#### 1. The ALJ's Findings

Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141.

\_\_\_\_\_The ALJ applied the sequential evaluation process outlined above to determine that plaintiff had engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date, having performed work activity for pay from 2004 through 2006 with earnings that exceeded substantial gainful activity levels. Tr. 13. Regarding plaintiff's alleged onset date of December 30, 1998, through 2004, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following impairments: degenerative disc disease and an anxiety disorder, but found that

these impairments were not "severe" pursuant to the regulations. Tr. 13. Therefore, the ALJ found plaintiff not disabled. Tr. 15.

# 2. Plaintiff's Allegation of Error

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff argues that he had one or more "severe" impairments from 1998 to 2004, and that the ALJ violated an alleged duty to recontact medical sources that would support plaintiff's claim.

"An impairment or combination of impairments can be found only if severe' the evidence establishes a abnormality that has 'no more than a minimal effect on individual's ability to work.'" Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). Further, "an impairment(s) is considered 'not severe' if it is a slight abnormality(ies) that causes no more than minimal limitation in individual's the ability function independently, to appropriately, and effectively in an age-appropriate manner." SSR 96-3p (1996 WL 374181).

I find that plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof at step two of the sequential evaluation process. I find no evidence in the record that plaintiff's impairments would have had more than a minimal effect on his mental or physical ability to perform basic work activities. As noted by the ALJ, plaintiff's medical records show only mild symptoms, and the objective evidence of record shows clinical findings that were either negative, or mild. Significantly, the record shows that plaintiff's symptoms were well controlled with treatment. Tr. 14. Plaintiff was, at one time, limited to sedentary work as he

recovered from surgery; however, post-surgery, plaintiff's EMG studies were normal, and treating physician William Smith, M.D., anticipated "no severe or ongoing disability once healed." Significantly, the ALJ requested that plaintiff provide further evidence of his impairments when plaintiff requested reconsideration of the initial denial of his application. Plaintiff declined to do so. Tr. 39. The following statement is significant in that it accurately portrays the state of the record: "[o] verall there is insufficient evidence both physically and mentally for this closed period to determine the severity of his allegations as the last dated records are in 2002. There are no records to cover from 2002-2004 at which time [claimant] returned to work as a handiman (sic) at a farm." Tr. 104. Finally, the psychologist who reviewed plaintiff's concluded repeatedly that there was "insufficient evidence to substantiate the presence of the disorder." Tr. 89-102. Therefore, the ALJ properly decided plaintiff's case based upon the medical evidence of record and the fact of plaintiff's subsequent return to vigorous substantial gainful activity at construction and agricultural jobs. Tr. 13.

21 ///

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

23

25

27

22 ///

///

24 ///

///

26 ///

///

28 ///

CONCLUSION The Commissioner's decision is based on substantial evidence, and is therefore, affirmed. This case is dismissed. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 10 day of June 2009. /s/ Ann Aiken Ann Aiken United States District Judge